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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
K E N T F . F U L L E R , a minor 
appearing by and through 
C O N N I E J . F U L L E R , his 
guardian ad litem, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, \ ^ -»T 
vs. / 13905 
Z I N I K S P O R T I N G GOODS 
COMPANY, a corporation, and 
T H O M A S E. FOLKMAN, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
S T A T E M E N T O F CASE 
This is a civil action brought by the plaintiff 
against defendants alleging false arrest, false imprison-
ment and malicious prosecution. 
Plaintiff was arrested while shoplifting at the store 
of defendant, Zinik Sporting Goods, located on Main 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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D I S P O S I T I O N I N L O W E R COUKT 
The matter was tried to a jury. The trial court 
submitted the three issues of false arrest, false imprison-
ment and malicious prosecution to the jury on separate 
verdicts. The jury's finding on each of the verdicts 
was in favor of the defendants, no cause of action. (R. 
150-152). Thereafter, plaintiff made a motion for a 
new trial which was denied. H e appeals therefrom. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek affirmance of the jury verdicts 
and trial court's order denying plaintiff a new trial. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
The facts hereinafter set forth will reflect the testi-
mony of the witnesses and the plaintiff in a light most 
favorable to the jury's findings and verdict, together 
with all reasonable inferences flowing therefrom. A 
considerable amount of time and space has been de-
voted by the plaintiff to a recitation of facts viewed 
in a light most favorable to the plaintiff but contrary 
to the jury's findings. Since it is the jury's prerogative 
to pass upon the credibility of the evidence and of de-
termining the facts, the defendants will recite the facts 
in such a light. Flynn v. W. P. Harlin Construction 
Company, 29 Utah 2d 327, 509 P.2d 356. 
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On August 14, 1973, at about two o'clock p.m., the 
plaintiff, Kent Fuller, rode into Salt Lake City on his 
motorcycle where he parked the same at a parking 
meter on Main Street (R. 7). H e entered Zinik's 
Sporting Goods on Main Street. He carried his helmet 
by the chin strap which was slung over his arm. When 
he entered the store, he went towards the rear where 
the mountain climbing equipment was located. (R. 12). 
In this area, he noticed a pegboard-type display of 
equipment used in mountain climbing. The display in-
cluded the price of each item on the board by a sign 
located over the peg from which the item was hung 
and also by a price sticker attached to the item. Mr. 
Fuller stated that he looked at the items and in doing 
so, picked up a karabiner to check its price (R. 33-34). 
A karabiner is an object used in climbing to attach to 
wedges driven into the rocks so that a rope may there-
after be attached. I t has the appearance of a large 
chain link where one end can be opened with a catching 
device to pass the link through the hole of the wedge. 
(Exhibit 2 P ) . 
While standing in the area of the climbing equip-
ment, an employee of the defendant, Zinik's, observed 
Fuller placing a karabiner under his shirt at the waist 
area where he attempted to conceal it. The employee, 
Mr. Spicer, after making this observation, called the 
matter to the attention of other employees, Richard 
Bringhurst and Gary Beckstead. (R. 68-70). As soon 
as Mr. Spicer passed the word to the other employees 
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that the plaintiff was apparently attempting to steal the 
karabiner, he moved from the area of observation to 
the check stand located near the center of the main floor 
of the store (R. 71). At this point, employee Bring-
hurst stated that he noticed the plaintiff fumbling his 
motorcycle helmet and lifting two envelopes which were 
in the helmet so he could put the karabiner inside the 
helmet and under the envelopes (R. 80). Beckstead 
was directed to approach Fuller and wait on him, (R. 
71). In doing so, he asked Fuller if he could be of 
assistance. Fuller told him he was interested in buy-
ing a water jug or container for his mother. At this 
point the employee directed him to the counter a few 
feet away where the water jugs or containers were dis-
playd (R. 95). After looking at a water jug or con-
tainer, Mr. Fuller indicated his desires to purchase the 
jug and with the clerk, Gary Beckstead, he walked to 
the check stand. Upon arriving at the check stand, 
Beckstead asked Mr. Fuller as follows: 
"Q. And did MT. Fuller find the water con-
tainer he was looking for? 
"A. I pointed it out to him. I believe I picked 
it off the deal and handed it to him. H e 
said that was what he wanted. I took it 
from him. I walked down to point 4 with 
him following behind him. 
"Q. That's the check stand? 
" A. Yes, where I walked around the check stand, 
and at that time, I asked him if there was 
anything else, and he said, no, and —." (R. 
95) 
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After the sale of the water bag had been entered 
on the cash register and payment received, the plain-
tiff then walked away from the check stand, carrying 
his helmet where he went to the counter containing 
bows and arrows. At this point, Mr. Thomas E . Folk-
man, the Assistant Manager for the store, observed the 
plaintiff standing at the display of bows and arrows. 
Mr. Folkman had been summoned by one of the em-
ployees from his office upstairs and had been informed 
there was a shoplifter in the store. Mr. Folkman then 
walked from near the front of the store toward the bow 
and arrow display which was south of the check stand 
area. Mr. Beckstead, the clerk, was then asked what 
took place at this point. He stated: 
"Q. Did you hear any conversation at all be-
tween Mr. Folkman and Mr. Fuller? 
"A. Just that Mr. Folkman asked Mr. Fuller 
if he had a karabiner. 
"Q. What did he say, Mr. Fuller ? 
"A. I don't recall what he said. I t gives me the 
impression that he said that he didn't know 
what he was talking about." (R. 96-97) 
Mr. Spicer who initially noticed the attempted 
theft testified: 
UQ. All right, thank you. Now, when you 
walked up to Kent Fuller, did you have a 
conversation with him ? 
"A. I said, 'May I help you, young man?' and 
he said'I 'm just looking around.' 
5 
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"Q. And where were you when Mr. Fuller and 
the other fellow, Mr. Beckstead, got up to 
the check stand? 
"A. I stayed in the same place. 
"Q. The north end of the check stand. 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Did you hear conversations between the two 
of them at the check stand? 
"A. Mr. Beckstead says: 'Would it be cash?' 
And he says 'Okay.' He says, 'Is there any-
thing else that you would like to pay for, 
young man?' And the reply from the cus-
tomer was, 'No. '" (R. 71) 
Mr. Fuller then walked from the check stand over 
to the bows and arrows. The Assistant Manager and 
defendant, Mr. Folkman, waited for the plaintiff to 
give him an opportunity to return the karabiner to the 
pegboard. When it became apparent to Mr. Folkman 
that the plaintiff was not going to do so, Mr. Folkman 
then approached him and asked him where the item was. 
The plaintiff then indicated that he didn't know what 
the Assistant Manager was talking about. Thereafter, 
he was requested to open his pockets inside out to see 
if they were being used to conceal the karabiner. When 
the pockets appeared empty, Mr. Folkman then told 
the plaintiff that he wanted to look inside the helmet 
underneath the envelopes (R. 102). At this point, the 
karabiner was discovered under the envelopes. There-
after, the plaintiff was taken to a room at the rear of 
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the store where Mr. Folkman called the police. An-
other employee stood outside the room while Mr. Folk-
man made the phone call. As soon as Mr. Folkman 
had completed the call, the following transpired: 
"Q. What did you do when you got into the 
back room ? 
"A. I sat down, called the police and just wait-
ed, and after I hung up the phone, Mr. Ful-
ler said, 'Why don't you let me pay for it?' 
I said 'I 'm sorry, but that's not the policy 
of the store. If you shoplift, you have to 
pay the price.' " (R. 102-103) 
Thereafter the police arrived and placed Fuller 
under arrest, taking him to the police station. Mr. 
Folkman further testified: 
"Q. And did Mr. Fuller at any time to your 
recollection ever tell the police that he 
hadn't stolen anything? 
"A. No, sir, he did not." (R. 53, 102-103) 
After arriving at the police station, the plaintiff 
called his mother. She then called the defendant store 
and indicated that her son had been arrested for shop-
lifting. She asked whether or not the Assistant Man-
ager, Mr. Folkman, wouldn't drop the charges. H e 
told Mrs. Fuller that he was not permitted to do such 
a thing as it was the store's policy to prosecute shop-
lifters. (R. 103-105). 
The plaintiff testified he was merely carrying the 
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merchandise, trying to make up his mind whether or 
not to buy it (R.43). No mention was ever made of 
the karabiner, its cost or the desire of the plaintiff 
to purchase the same until after the police were called. 
At this point, he then asked the Assistant Manager if 
he wouldn't permit him to pay for the item and leave 
the store. 
POINTS URGED FOR AFFIRMANCE 
POINT I. T H E TRIAL COURT PROPERLY 
REFUSED TO GRANT PLAINTIFF 'S MO-
TION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT AS TO 
LIABILITY FOR H I S DETENTION AND 
ARREST. 
POINT II . T H E TRIAL COURT PROPERLY 
INSTRUCTED T H E JURY ON T H E ISSUES 
OF PROOF. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. T H E TRIAL COURT PROPERLY 
REFUSED TO GRANT PLAINTIFF 'S MO-
TION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT AS TO 
LIABILITY FOR H I S DETENTION AND 
ARREST. 
8 
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Appellant in his brief cites Section 77-13-30, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in support of his 
argument. That statute states: 
"A peace oiiicer, or a merchant, a merchant's 
employee, servant or agent, who has reasonable 
and probable ground for believing that goods 
held or displayed for sale by the merchant have 
been taken by a person with intent to steal may, 
for the purpose of investigating such unlawful 
act and attempting to affect a recovery of said 
goods, detain such person in a reasonable manner 
for a reasonable length o f i I n u 
A companion statute concerning civil hahiht 
arresting shoplifters recites as follows: 
"A peace officer or a merchant, a merchant's 
employee, servant or agent, who causes such de-
tention of a person as provided in Section 77-
13-30, or who causes the arrest of a person for 
larceny of goods held or displayed for sale shall 
not be criminally or civilly liable where the 
peace officer, or merchants, merchant's employee 
servant or agent has reasonable and probable 
ground for believing that the person detained or 
arrested committed larceny of goods held or dis-
played for sale." Section 77-13-32, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended. 
Thereafter, in appellants brief, he cites decisions 
and statutes from other jurisdictions which admittedly 
contain provisions unlike those of IJtah statutes. 
The jury in the instant case reviewed all of the 
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evilence. I t answered each and every verdict in favor 
of the defendants. I t was the prerogative of the jury 
to decide whether or not the plaintiff was in the store 
with an intent to steal the defendant Zinik's property. 
I t was further the prerogative of the jury to decide 
whether or not the employees of the defendant, includ-
ing Mr. Folkman, acted reasonably and prudently 
under the circumstances and had reasonable and prob-
able grounds for believing that the goods held by Zinik's 
for sale had been taken by the plaintiff with the intent 
to steal. These issues of fact were found against the 
plaintiff. Unless the plaintiff can show that the jury's 
finding is clearly erroneous and contrary to the evidence 
viewed in a light most favorable to their findings, the 
verdicts should be allowed to stand. 
Plaintiff in his brief has omitted testimony con-
cerning his attempt to conceal the merchandise and his 
refusal to pay for the merchandise when passing 
through the check stand. Plaintiff's counsel cross-ex-
amined the defendant and Assistant Manager, Folk-
man, concerning the propriety of customers carrying 
merchandise with them in and about the store trying to 
decide whether to make a purchase. In response to 
these inquiries, Mr. Folkman answered as follows: 
"A. Most people do not inspect merchandise 
without looking at it. I can't see how he 
inspected it in his motorcycle helmet under-
neath the pictures without seeing it." (R. 
106). 
10 
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Plaintiff testifier on direct examination that he 
did iu ' '. * •> N(!'.-;. the merchandise. The jurors 
obviously did »..•* ; t In-\r this testimony in light of all 
of the other evidence and so indicated by their verdicts. 
Appelant does concede that the Utah Statutes quoted 
above absolve employees from civil liability if reason-
able and probable ground exists for believing that a 
person is intending to commit larceny of goods. The 
jurors, after hearing all of the testimony, including that 
of the plaintiff, unanimously concluded that there was 
probable grounds to believe that plaintiff was trying to 
steal the karabiner. There is nothing in our .statutes 
that require the merchant or his employees lo wait 
until the thief has fled before attempting recovery of 
the goods. The plaintiff had passed through the check 
stand and rejected a request to pay for the goods. H e 
fiother told Mr. Folkman that he didn't know what he 
was talking about when he asked him w here lie had 
hidden the karabiner. 
Plaintiff was given every reasonable opportunity 
to pay for the merchandise or remove it from his helmet 
and replace it on the shelf which he did not do. When 
it became apparent that lie was not going to do either 
of the alternatives mentioned above, he was confronted 
by Mr. Folkman. At this late point, Ilit plaintiff did 
not tell anyone that he had the karabiner on his person 
nor did he tell them he wanted to purchase il He re-
mained silent while he was asked to go through his 
pockets in an effort to locate the item. When it w as 
11 
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not found in its pockets, Mr. Folkman then asked him 
to display his helmet in order that he might discover 
what was underneath the envelopes. The item was then 
found by Mr. Folkman inside the helmet. I t was not 
until the police had actually been called that the plain-
tiff requested permission to purchase the item and leave 
the store to avoid arrest. He told his mother he had 
been arrested for shoplifting in the store when he tele-
phoned her from the jail. She was in the courtroom 
during all of the testimony acting as his guardian ad 
litem . Testimony was received that Mrs. Fuller called 
the store stating that her son had been arrested for 
shoplifting, indicating that he had never done anything 
like this before. She asked that the charges be dropped. 
No rebuttal evidence was offered. 
Certainly, the facts as stated above clearly show 
there was reasonable grounds for the jury to make the 
findings necessary to support its verdicts. The facts 
surrounding the shoplifting were for the jury's deter-
mination. In the case of Hindmarsh v. O. P . Skaggs 
Foodliner, 21 Utah 2d 413, 446 P.2d 410, this Court 
discussed the rules that apply in reviewing the findings 
of a jury. I t stated: 
"When the jury has made its determination, 
these further basic principles of review apply: 
Inasmuch as it is the prerogative of the jury to 
judge the credibility of the witnesses, we are 
obliged to assume that they believed the evidence 
which supports their verdict; and therefore, it 
is our duty to survey the evidence and all reason-
12 
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able inferences that fairly ran <»<. deduced there-
from in the light favorable N» ihe wnlict." 
See aNe» Ewell <§ ^ow, /wc. a A'aft jLaAtf <7i% Corp-
oration, '27 I Jtah 2d 188, 493 P.2d 1283; Ivie v. Rich-
ardson, 9 Utah 2d 5, 336 P.2d 781; and Niemann v. 
Grand Central Markets, Inc., 9 IJtah 2d 46, 337 P.2d 
424. 
Plaintiff recites considerable evidence and testi-
money to the effect that he had the funds in a checking 
account and thai his folks had a charge account in the 
store which would negate any idea that he had a reason 
to steal. Fortunately, all thefts are not committed by 
the poor. The jurors chose to believe the defendants' 
evidence. They obviously believed that the plaintiff, 
Kent Fuller, was attempting to steal the merchandise. 
The court correctly refused a directed verdict on these 
factual issues. 
P O I N T I I . T H E T R I A L COURT P R O P E R L Y 
I N S T R U C T E D T H E JITRY ON TTTF. ISSUES 
O F PROOF. 
The plaintiff complains that the court improperly 
instructed the jiiry concerning the burden of proof 
required of the parties. The court gave Instruction 
No. 11 which told the jurors in substance that Hu 
statutes quoted permit employees of merchants In dr 
tain persons where there is reasonable and probable 
13 
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grounds to believe the person being detained or arrested 
was committing larceny of goods held for sale. The 
court thereafter informed the jurors in said instruction 
that if they believed the plaintiff took the goods with 
intent to steal and that his detention was reasonable 
under the circumstances, they should return a verdict 
for the defendants (R. 166). The court then gave In-
struction No. 19. This instruction told the jurors in 
essence that if at the time of the plaintiff's arrest, the 
jury should find that defendants did not have reason-
able or probable grounds for believing that plaintiff had 
committed larceny, they were further instructed that 
they should return a verdict in favor of the plaintiff 
and against the defendants (R. 174). The instructions 
given by the court clearly and accurately informed the 
jurors of the law involved in the case. The fact that 
the court did not give a supplemental instruction on 
proof did not in any way modify the proof required 
of the parties to the action. The jurors were certainly 
not misled by the court's refusal to give the additional 
instruction. In the case of In re Richards Estate, 5 
Utah 2d 106, 297 P.2d 542, this Honorable Court 
stated: 
"A refusal to give an instruction cannot be the 
basis for reversal unless the jury was insuffici-
ently advised of the issue they were to determine, 
or it appear that they would have been confused 
or misled to the prejudice of the persons com-
plaining thereof." 
The jurors were certainly in possession of all of 
14 
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the facts. The court's instructions clearly indicated 
that they were to decide the issues of probable cause 
and what the result would be based upon their find-
ings. They were clearly told that if they felt there was 
no probable cause for the defendants to detain and 
arrest the plaintiff, then defendants would be liable to 
the plaintiff. The issues were properly presented to 
the jury and resolved against the plaintiff. This Court 
stated in the case of Hales v. Peterson, 11 Utah 2d 
411,360P.2d822: 
"However, from the standpoint of administering 
even-handed justice, the court must dispassion-
ately survey such claims against the over-all pic-
ture of the trial, and if the parties have been af-
forded an opportunity to fully and fairly pre-
sent their evidence and arguments upon the 
issues, and the jury has made its determination 
thereon, the objective of the proceedings has 
been accomplished. And the judgment should 
not be disturbed unless it is shown that there is 
an error which is substantial and prejudicial in 
the sense that it appears that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the result would have been diff-
erent in the absence of such error, which we 
have concluded does not exist here." 
This Court also considered complaints lodged 
against instructions given at trial and reviewed the law 
concerning the same in the case of Rowley v. Graven 
Brothers § Company, 26 Utah 2d 448, 491 P.2d 1209. 
The Court stated: 
14
 The mandate of our law is that we do not re-
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verse for mere error or irregularity. We do so 
only if the complaining party has been deprived 
of a fair trial. The test to be applied is: Was 
there error or irregularity such that there is a 
reasonable likelihood to believe that in its absence 
there would have been a result more favorable 
to him? If upon a survey of the whole evidence 
this question must be answered in the negative, 
then there is no justifiable basis for reversal of 
a judgment." 
The court's instructions given at the time of trial 
clearly informed the jury of the issues. The jurors 
obviously found that there was probable cause to de-
tain the plaintiff and cause his arrest. Plaintiff has 
shown absolutely nothing in the record to indicate that 
the court should have given the additional instruction 
and had it done so, the jury's determination would have 
been different. The trial court correctly instructed 
the jurors on the law. Based upon the evidence and 
the court's instructions, the jurors found against the 
plaintiff. 
On Page 28 of plaintiff's brief, he states: 
"The fact that the jury returned a verdict of 
No Cause of Action can only be justified by a 
finding that justification existed for making the 
detention and arrest." 
With this statement we agree. The jury's deter-
mination was made from facts presented at trial. Such 
is their exclusive prerogative. Plaintiff has failed to 
carry his burden of showing reversible error. 
16 
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CONCLUSION 
I t is readily understandable why counsel for plain-
tiff, his son, feels so strongly about the case in ques-
tion. The jurors obviously felt from the testimony of 
the plaintiff and witnesses that there was an intent to 
steal the merchandise. Their findings, unanimous on 
each verdict, clearly advised the litigants and the court 
that the jurors felt there was ample cause for the de-
tention and arrest of the plaintiff for his conduct. I t 
is respectfully submitted that the juror's verdicts and 
the ruling of the trial court in refusing to direct a 
verdict or grant a new trial to the plaintiff should not 
be disturbed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
B A Y L E A N D L A U C H N O R 
Wallace R. Lauchnor 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Respondents 
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